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Abstract 
Software safety testing requirements elicitation method was put forward based on the safety-critical software 
including safety testing requirements classification, safety testing requirements decomposition and the finishing of 
elicitation sources in order to get more perfect software safety testing requirements. And it was compared with the 
safety testing requirements of current test methods. Finally the elicited testing requirements was applied in a certain 
engine control software, and was validated more sufficiently. 
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1. Introduction 
Software safety testing is a key link to ensure the quality of software. It is different from conventional 
software testing. It focuses on events that lead system to catastrophic accidents.  Its fundamental purpose 
is to reduce the risk of catastrophic accidents of system. Because of different objects, software safety 
testing is quite different from routine testing in testing requirements elicitation. 
It is one of the hot spot of current research for safety-critical software to carry out safety testing. There 
have been many research results. Software testing research facing RTCA DO-178B mainly focuses on 
meeting technical method of MC/DC coverage rate demands[5][6]; In addition, there are software safety 
testing methods which are based on fault tree analysis[8][9]and Petri net analysis[10][11], etc. The 
methods above met the following problems in practical application: 1) Because of the software safety 
testing requirements were not elicited sufficiently, it can’t only rely on the cover test to ensure safety; 2) 
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Lots of software testing contained safety testing this testing type, but it only used enumeration method to 
give the testing requirements, the consideration was not quite comprehensive; 3) Various safety testing 
methods put forward its own safety test practice, but lacked of systematic consideration towards to 
adequacy of the whole software safety testing.  
Therefore, how to comb software safety testing requirements systematically about software safety 
testing and achieving more comprehensive coverage of safety test for software safety events and elements 
is a problem to be solved.  
This paper engaged in research on elicitation of safety testing requirements for airborne software. It 
was on the basis of the existing software safety results. It was to get more sufficient safety testing 
requirements to improve the adequacy of software safety testing and ensure the safety of products.  
 
Nomenclature 
 
A software safety 
               Software safety refers to software has the ability of not leading to the accident [7]. 
B  software safety testing 
              There is no authoritative definition at present. The definition is given referring to [7]: Software 
safety testing is the test to verify the safety of software. 
C software safety requirements 
               Software safety requirements are decomposed from system safety requirements. It assure that 
systems maintain in a safe condition and make a full reaction to potential failure at the same time 
[2]. 
D            software safety testing requirements 
               Software safety testing requirements mainly solve the problem that what are tested in software 
safety testing. That is specified what need safety testing about the object under test. 
              Software safety testing requirements usually use safety requirements in software development 
              as the foundation to carry out the analysis. It forms the testable contents through refining, 
              decomposing and supplying the safety requirements. 
2. Elicitation of Software Safety Testing Requirements 
2.1. Software safety requirements classification 
This paper divided software safety requirements into three classes broadly. They are identified safety 
requirements, unidentified safety requirements and the missing safety requirements. Software safety 
requirements classification was shown in Figure 1.  
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The testing requirements can be divided into two categories: general test requirements and specific test 
requirements. General test requirements cover the missing safety requirements. Specific requirements 
include two categories: identified safety testing requirements and unidentified safety testing requirements.  
General test requirements include general safety constraints, general failure mode constraints, safety 
coding standard, safety design criterion, design constraints and similar software failure appeared on the 
history. General safety constraint is the accumulation of historical experience, such as general 
requirements list gives in NASA - STD – 8719.  
There are many types of software failure mode. And among them there are three kinds of failure types 
are common. They are operation type failure, sequence type failure and value type failure. We can 
communicate with experts and developers or refer to the test documentation to obtain similar software 
failure appeared on the history.  
Identified safety requirements include specified safety-critical function, specified safety-critical 
performance and specified safety-critical interface. Unidentified safety requirements include safety-
critical scenario, risk cut set constraint determined by safety analysis, operating requirements of system in 
different environment, system robustness requirements, operator/computer system interactive anomaly 
constraint, interface data anomaly constraint and code anomaly constraint.  
Safety-critical scenario considers the combination of each safety-critical function in order to determine 
the testing method of combinatorial functions more efficiently. We usually test each function in the 
conventional function test. And test some combinatorial functions in comprehensive test. But this 
combinational test completely depends on tester’s experience at present. It has no specific guidance 
method. It is important that how to choose the function to combine in limited test resources.  
Robustness requirements range proposed in this paper was greater than abnormal condition test and 
boundary test proposed in conventional test. It also include input data of failure mode determined by FHA 
or FMECA, not allowed state or mode conversion and system anomaly constraint, extreme anomaly 
constraints, etc.  
In addition to contain the conventional data boundary anomaly, interface data anomaly also include 
order, time, dynamic input/output and interrupt, power, mains fluctuation, momentary power failure, 
system error or data exception generated by hardware failure.  
Software safety testing requirements decomposition in this paper not only covered the identified 
software safety requirements, but also covered the unidentified/missing safety requirements. Therefore, 
this paper gave the relatively perfect software safety testing requirements from the top. And we could test 
them based on the level of the testing requirements. We could use unit testing, integration testing and 
system testing, etc.  
2.3. Elicitation sources of software safety testing 
Based on the software safety testing requirements decomposition above, the elicitation sources were 
shown in Figure 3.  
The identified safety testing requirements are mainly from software requirements specification, 
software development program, specification, software interface document, software design documents, 
and safety analysis results. Unidentified/missing safety testing requirements are mainly from the 
standards, experience and other requirements.  
The standard demands include safety design standard, test standards, as well as aerospace software 
standards, such as GJB/Z 102, NASA - STD – 8719, and software system safety manuals, etc.  
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practice are all general. Their guidance is not strong. Safety testing inspects safety and security existing in 
software be effective or not. Specific testing requirements are as follows. 
xTest the processing power and protective capability of software in a standard configuration;  
x7est the processing power and protective capability of software under abnormal conditions;  
xMust contain testing of boundary, out of bounds and boundary attaches;  
x7est the safety-critical operation mistakes.  
These testing requirements above are more confined to the concepts. They are very limited for how to 
develop actual testing, what the testing object is and how to design test cases.  
Compared with common testing requirements related safety, this paper proposed more comprehensive 
safety testing requirements from the top. Common testing requirements include specified safety-critical 
function, specified safety-critical performance and specified safety-critical interface. In addition to 
include test requirements of routine testing types, we need increase test requirements categories which 
should consider the test item. They are robustness requirements, interface data anomaly constraints, 
system operator/computer system interactive anomaly constraints and code anomaly constraints. Testing 
requirements categories completely new are general safety constraints, general failure mode constraints 
similar software failure appeared on the history, safety coding standard, safety design criterion, design 
constraints, safety-critical scenario, risk cut set constraints determined by safety analysis, operating 
requirements of system in different environment. The detailed comparison was shown in table 1.  
Table 1. Contrast of software safety requirements and commonly used safety testing demand 
Software safety testing requirements proposed in this paper The requirements of the 
current test system
Requirement Type Software safety requirements category existin
g 
Need to 
increas
e 
newly 
increase
d 
General safety 
testing requirements 
 
general safety constraints, general failure mode constraints similar 
software failure appeared on the history, safety coding standard, 
safety design criterion, design constraintsǃsafety coding standard 
  ɰ 
Software system 
safety-critical 
requirements 
specified safety-critical function, specified safety-critical performance 
ɰ   
robustness requirements 
 ɰ  
safety-critical scenario, risk cut set constraint determined by safety 
analysis, operating requirements of system in different environment. 
  ɰ 
Software interface 
safety-critical 
requirements 
specified safety-critical interface 
ɰ   
interface data anomaly constraint, system operator/computer system 
interactive anomaly constraint and code anomaly constraint 
 ɰ  
4. The Elicitation of Engine Control Software Safety Testing Requirements 
4.1. Introduction of software under testing 
Numerical control system of engine is an important part of the engine fuel and control system. It 
consists of electronic controller, numerical control system software, sensor, hydraulic machinery and 
corresponding electrical system, etc. The control software is the core of numerical control system. The 
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main functions include I/O, fault diagnosis and treatment, control task processing, BIT, data storage, data 
communication, etc. 
This paper took safety requirements of system test as an example. It elicited some general and specific 
safety test requirements of one engine control software.  
4.2. General safety test requirements of software under test 
General safety test requirements include general safety requirements, general failure mode constraints 
similar software failure appeared on the history. Only two general safety requirements were described in 
this paper. It based on software safety general test requirements given in NASA [3]. It was described in 
table 2.  
Table 2. General safety test requirements 
Software general safety requirements Software general safety testing requirements 
Requirement 
identification 
Requirement description Test item 
identification 
Test item description 
RS-TY01 The software must have 
the ability to put system 
in safe state, when the 
hardware fails, system 
fails conducted by 
software or configuration 
and the current running 
status is inconsistency 
RS-TY01-01 Whether the software can put system in safe state, when there are 
hardware failure that can lead to system failure 
RS-TY01-02 Whether the software can put system in safe state, when there are 
software failure that can lead to system failure 
RS-TY01-03 Whether the software can put system in safe state, when there are 
combinative failure of software and hardware that can lead to 
system failure 
RS-TY01-04 Whether the software can put system in safe state, when software 
configuration and the current running status is inconsistency 
RS-TY02 The software must be 
designed to shut down 
system orderly when the 
power fails, so it won't 
produce potential unsafe 
state 
RS-TY02-01 Whether the system can shut down orderly and won't produce 
potential unsafe state, when power failure(low voltage) 
RS-TY02-02 Whether the system can shut down orderly and won't produce 
potential unsafe state, when power failure(high voltage) 
RS-TY02-03 Whether the system can shut down orderly and won't produce 
potential unsafe state, when power failure(voltage instability) 
RS-TY02-04 Whether the system can shut down orderly and won't produce 
potential unsafe state, when power failure(Voltage intermittence) 
RS-TY02-05 Whether the system can shut down orderly and won't produce 
potential unsafe state, when power off suddenly 
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4.3. Specific safety testing requirements of software 
1) Testing requirements based on safety-critical scenario 
It will lead to serious safety consequences, if engine alarm function failure of over temperature and 
pressure. So important testing was carried out . Now scenario testing requirements were structured. The 
signal was in alarm state, only when the low pressure turbine exhaust temperature was in combat (training 
state) and reach the control plan plus 20ć. The signal was in normal state, only when the low pressure 
turbine exhaust temperature was in combat (training state) and be equal to the control plan or starting 
below or equal to 900ć. A brief description was shown in table 3. 
Table 3. Scenario testing requirements of over temperature 
Software safety requirements Software safety testing requirements 
Requirement 
identification 
Requirement description Test item 
identification 
Test item description 
RS-GJ  Test the scenario of engine over 
temperature alarm function 
RS-GJ-01 Engine operates with over pressure below alarm 
temperature                       
RS-GJ-02 Engine operates with over pressure above alarm 
temperature 
RS-GJ-03 Engine operates with over pressure at alarm 
temperature 
RS-GJ-04 Engine operates with over pressure and warmings up 
to over the alarm temperature 
RS-GJ-05 Engine operates with over pressure and cooling down 
to below alarm temperature 
RS-GJ-06 Engine operates with over pressure and warmings up 
below the alarm temperature, and be forced self-
checking  
RS-GJ-07 Engine operates with over pressure and warmings up 
over the alarm temperature, and be forced self-
checking 
RS-GJ-08 Engine operates with over pressure and cooling down 
below alarm temperature, and be forced self-checking 
RS-GJ-09 Engine operates with over pressure and cooling down 
over the alarm temperature, and be forced self-
checking 
…… …… 
2) System robustness test requirements 
A brief description towards to robustness was shown in table 4.  
Table 4. System robustness test requirements 
Software safety requirements Software safety testing requirements 
Requirement 
identification 
Requirement description Test item 
identification 
Test item description 
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RS-LB  Test the robustness of engine 
starting function 
RS-LB-01 The time that the engine drop to training state is 
longer than the set time  
RS-LB-02 Starting engine on the ground and be over 
temperature  
RS-LB-03 Starting engine on the ground and be over pressure 
RS-LB-04 Starting engine on the ground and be over-running 
RS-LB-05 Air starting engine and be over temperature 
RS-LB-06 Air starting engine and be over pressure 
RS-LB-07 Air starting engine and be over-running 
3) Interface data abnormal test requirement 
Here took frequency amount as an example to test the abnormal interface data. A brief description was 
shown in table 5.  
Table 5. Interface data anomaly constraint 
Software safety requirements Software safety testing requirements 
Requirement 
identification 
Requirement 
description 
Test item 
identification 
Test item description 
RS-JK Test the abnormal 
interface data of 
frequency 
RS-JK-01 Whether the elicitation and conversion of frequency amount is 
correct, when system power off instantaneously 
RS-JK-02 Whether the elicitation and conversion of frequency amount is 
correct, when system voltage fluctuation 
RS-JK-03 Whether the elicitation and conversion of frequency amount is 
correct, when system fail temporarily 
RS-JK-04 Whether the elicitation and conversion of frequency amount is 
correct, when the elicitation time interval is greater than the 
regulation interval 
RS-JK-05 Whether the elicitation and conversion of frequency amount is 
correct, when the elicitation time interval is smaller than the 
regulation interval 
4.4. The comparison with safety testing requirements commonly used 
This paper applied elicited testing requirements to a engine control software. We elicited general and 
specific safety testing requirements under the guiding ideology of this paper. The requirements got here 
greatly supplied safety testing requirements commonly used.  
The general safety testing requirements category was not mentioned at present. It was newly increased. 
And it added all the test item in RS-TY01. For specific safety testing requirements, safety-critical 
scenario testing requirements were also newly added. Scenario testing requirements of over temperature 
combined safety-critical functions. It was not mentioned in commonly used test. And this paper added 
and perfected the robustness and abnormal interface data test requirements. RS-LB-01, RS-LB-05, RS-
LB-06 and RS-LB-07 were newly added for robustness test requirements. Abnormal interface data test 
requirements of frequency amount added all the test items comparing with laboratorial demands.  
We can see that the test items of testing requirements elicited in this paper were 30, there were 22 
newly added. The percentage was 73.3%. The elicited requirements covered software safety testing 
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requirements more comprehensive. So it improved the quality of software safety test. The comparison 
was shown in table 6. 
Table 6. Comparison of commonly used safety testing requirements 
Requirement type Newly 
added 
Original 
quantity 
General safety testing requirements 4 5 
Safety-critical scenario testing 
requirements 
9 0 
Robustness testing requirements 4 3 
Abnormal interface data testing 
requirements 
5 0 
The total test item 22 8 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studied the elicitation of safety-critical software testing requirements. At last we got more 
perfect requirements by classifying, decomposing testing requirements and collecting the sources of 
testing requirements. And the elicited requirements were applied to an engine control software. It stated 
that testing requirements elicited in this paper are more sufficient. The decomposition category will be 
perfected in subsequent work. And more perfect testing method of testing requirements will be proposed.  
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